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Insight into a Special Relation: 
the European Parliament and the European Ombudsman
Abstract. According to Arts. 20 (ex Art. 17 TEC) and 24 (ex Art. 21 TEC) of TFEU, European citizens are entitled 
to apply to the European Ombudsman. This right, stemming from European citizenship, is furthermore explained 
in Art. 228 TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC), stating that any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or 
having its registered ofﬁ ce in a Member State can complain in instances of maladministration in connection with 
the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, ofﬁ ces or agencies.1 The European Parliament, as one of these 
institutions, represents next to the Council of the European Union the legislative power of the EU. From this 
starting point, the study aims to analyze the type of relation between an institution with decades-long history and 
an ofﬁ ce with a history not much more than a decade and a half.
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The establishment of the European ofﬁ ce was the result of a long way, formed among many 
by the attitude of the European Parliament and its Committee on Petitions.2 If we try to 
describe the relationship between the European Ombudsman and the Parliament, the word 
“speciﬁ c” seems to be the most adequate: the relation has more levels and these levels with 
connecting and complementing each other create its special nature and this can be 
approached or characterized from more sideways. 
1. The petition and the complaint
Before the establishment the Ofﬁ ce of the European Ombudsman by the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Committee on Petitions made an attempt to draw up a deﬁ nition for the petition in the 
Resolution on the deliberation of the Committee on Petitions during the parliamentary year 
1993–1994, declaring that petitions are all complaints, requests for an opinion, demands for 
action, reactions to Parliament resolutions or decisions by other Community institutions or 
bodies forwarded to it by individuals and associations.3  The necessity of further speciﬁ cation 
led the Committee to engage again in the issue and as a result, with little change in the prior 
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1 Except the Court of Justice of the European Union acting in judicial role.
2 See more Friedery, R.: The Role of the European Ombudsman in Dispute Solving. Acta 
Iuridica Hungarica, 49 (2008) 4, 359−376; Friedery, R.: Az Európai Ombudsman Hivatalának 
történelmi és intézményi aspektusai (Historical and Institutional Aspects of the Ofﬁ ce of the European 
Ombudsman). In: Balogh, M. (ed.): Diszciplínák határain innen és túl (Within and Beyond the 
Borders of Disciplines). Budapest, 2007, 125−139.
3 Report on the amendment of Rule 161 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, 16 December 1997, 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Veriﬁ cation of Credentials and Immunities (Rapporteur: 
Brian Crowley). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference= A4-1997 
-0416&language=EN#top
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deﬁ nition, a petition was to be regarded as a requests for intervention, for action, for change 
of policy or for an opinion, submitted to the Parliament by any citizen of the Union and any 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered ofﬁ ce in a Member State, individually 
or in association with others.4
The TFEU and the Ombudsman’s Statute offer also a guide to make a difference 
between the petition and the complaint. If we compare Art. 228 TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) to 
Art. 227 TFEU (ex Art. 194 TEC) then the difference between the complaint and the petition 
can be clearly noticed. The former stipulates that the Ombudsman is entitled to receive 
complaints about alleged maladministration in connection with the activities of the Union 
institutions, bodies, ofﬁ ces or agencies, the latter states that the European Parliament can be 
petitioned on matters belonging to the Union’s ﬁ elds. Thus, in the case of the petitions the 
complained activity must relate to the ﬁ elds of the European Union,5 while in the case of 
the Ombudsman this phrase cannot be seen6. This constitutes the main difference between 
the two non-judicial dispute resolution forums; it is possible to address a petition to the 
European Parliament in connection with Member States’ authorities. The right to petition is 
of more general nature, whereby complaints can be in connection only with maladministration 
performed by Union institutions, bodies, ofﬁ ces and agencies. The Ombudsman helps to 
shed light on maladministration, the Committee on Petitions has the task to give adequate 
answer to complaints or opinion of natural or legal person in connection with the 
Parliament’s resolution or decision of institutions and bodies. Art. 228 TFEU (ex Art. 195 
TEC) states that a complaint can be lodged not only directly to the European Ombudsman 
but as well through a Member of the European Parliament: because there is no need for 
individual or direct interests to lodge a complaint, the person affected can persuade a 
Member of Parliament or other person fulﬁ lling the personal requirements to refer the 
complaint on his or her own name to the Ombudsman.7;8 This possibility earns signiﬁ cance 
in cases, where the complainant does not fulﬁ l the personal requirements, e.g. is not a 
European citizen. Contrary to this−although the subjects of the provisions are the same, 
thus any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered 
ofﬁ ce in a Member State−, the person addressing the petition has to be directly affected by 
the matter and has to address the petition directly to the Parliament, thus has no options as 
in the case of the complaint. 
The procedures of the Committee on Petitions and the Ofﬁ ce cannot be regarded as 
each other rivals. A basis for the co-operation is, when the lodged complaint regarding its 
content can be considered more a petition and vice versa. Hence, in this kind of cases the 
ofﬁ ce will transmit the complaints toward the European Parliament’s Committee on 
4 Resolution on the deliberations of the Committee on Petitions for the parliamentary year 
1996−1997 (Rapporteur: Roy Perry). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT& 
reference=A4-1997-0190&language=EN
5 According to Art. 227 TFEU (ex Art. 194 TEC) “…have the right to address ... a petition to 
the European Parliament on a matter which comes within the Union’s ﬁ elds of activity”.
6 According to Art. 228 TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) “…empowered to receive complaints..
concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, ofﬁ ces or 
agencies…”.
7 In the ﬁ rst Annual Report of 1995, 8 from the 298 registered complaints had been lodged 
through a Member of Parliament.
8 Thus, complaints can be lodged actio popularis with the condition that both the complainant 
and the subject of the complaint can be identiﬁ ed. 
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Petitions, and the petitions, which are essentially complaining about maladministration, are 
automatically forwarded to the Ombudsman’s Ofﬁ ce.9 The necessity of a successful co-
operation between the two comes from cases when it is not clear to which body should 
citizens turn to, what the difference is between the two procedures. Since in the relevant 
legislation this procedure is only an option, a possibility and not a duty for the Ombudsman, 
it is not automatically made: the Ombudsman can only make use of the transfer if the 
complainant also agrees with it,10 and the Committee on Petitions must follow this way, 
too.11;12 We should point out that if a complaint has already been investigated as a petition 
by the Committee, it is usually not justiﬁ ed for a further investigation by the Ombudsman, 
only when new evidence has been submitted in the meantime,13 but the Ombudsman’s 
inquiry as an additional procedure is only in the latter case possible.
The relationship between the Parliament and the Ombudsman is even more toned: the 
Parliament even helps the Ombudsman to carry on the inquiry. This stems from the 
provisions that EU institutions, bodies, ofﬁ ces and agencies are required−such as the 
Parliament−to supply the Ombudsman with the requested information and must guarantee 
the access to their documents necessary for the Ombudsman. National institutions and 
bodies are also obliged to provide at the request of the Ombudsman with all the information 
which could clear the EU institution from maladministration. In this case access can be 
granted only after the concerned Member State had been notiﬁ ed, with exceptions when the 
information required is subject to law, or to secrecy falling under administrative decision, or 
fall under provision which cannot be made public. If the Ombudsman does not receive the 
requested help, or the request is refused, the Ombudsman can notify the European 
Parliament, which steps in using its political power to requests the necessary information 
for the Ombudsman. Furthermore, with the aim to share information of common interest, 
the Committee on Petitions−where it ﬁ nds it necessary−invites the Ombudsman to attend 
the meetings of general and speciﬁ c nature and to discuss matters of common interest.
9 Soon after the beginning, during the year 1996, 10 petitions were handed over to the Ofﬁ ce 
and 5 complaints were given to the Committee of Petitions, in both cases with the consent of the 
complainant. The European Ombudsman suggested in further 42 cases that they should turn to the 
Parliament.
10 Art. 2(3) of the Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting implementing provisions, 
adopted on 8 July 2002 and amended by decisions of the Ombudsman of 5 April 2004 and 3 December 
2008. Furthermore Implementing Provisions.
11 See case 441/2002/ME, in which he advised that the submitted complaint should be forwarded 
to the Parliament. Indeed, the complainant alleged that the decision of the Council of the European 
Union limited his access to and the use of vitamins and minerals. Since the complaint contained no 
maladministration, but concerned the merit of Community legislation, therefore, the Ombudsman 
rejected it, but suggested to be referred as petition. See The European Ombudsman: Annual Report 
2002. Luxembourg, 2003, 18.
12 The Ombudsman acted similarly in case 2881/2004/JMA, where a group of complainants 
sent an open letter to the El Triangle newspaper in Barcelona about alleged discrimination, alleging 
that the European Constitution did not recognize the Catalan language as ofﬁ cial. However, the 
complaint related to a proposal for amending the Treaties, and according to the Ombudsman it was 
not related to maladministration thus, it fell outside the scope of his mandate and was forwarded to 
the European Parliament as petition. See The European Ombudsman: Annual Report 2004. 
Luxembourg, 2005, 39.
13 The European Ombudsman: Annual Report 2000. Luxembourg, 2001, 21.
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2. Subject of inquiry: the maladministration
In the provisions regarding the European Ombudsman, we cannot ﬁ nd any further 
speciﬁ cation what they understand under the term of maladministration. It is only referred 
to in the Treaty and the Statute to the extent that the Ombudsman examines instances of 
maladministration. It is established that maladministration occurs, when an EU institution 
does not act in accordance with the Community law, or neglects or fails to take account the 
principles and rules created by the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
The uncertainty surrounding of the deﬁ nition of maladministration made the European 
Ombudsman further clariﬁ cation,14 and the deﬁ nition was also adopted by a 1998 European 
Parliament decision. However, cases of maladministration cannot be listed exhaustively, 
which is proved by the complaints handed to the Ombudsman ofﬁ ce. Indeed, a wild variety 
of situations must be taken into careful consideration, whether they have exhausted instances 
of maladministration or not.15 Regarding the European Parliament, limits of maladministration 
can be determined by the European Parliament’s political power. The classical Ombudsman 
ofﬁ ces have been established within the frame of the parliament to control the administration, 
and not for the supervision of the parliament’s legislative or other work. Although the 
situation cannot be fully compared to the European level, the activities of the European 
Parliament cannot be considered as administrative activities, thus complaints in connection 
with the European Parliament’s and its Committee on Petitions’ political activity are to be 
considered inadmissible. Therefore, for example in complaint 420/9.2.96/PLM/B the alleged 
maladministration, namely poor administration by the Committee on Petitions the handling 
of the petitions was more of a political issue than maladministration: as the right to petition 
laid down in the Treaty has a constitutional value, the Parliament’s responsibility is to 
organize its services thus it can perform its institutional functions.16 Similarly, the decision 
of the European Parliament about the French nuclear tests in the Paciﬁ c was inadmissible 
because it concerned a political decision.17
As we cannot see a clear division of legislative and executive powers at European 
level, so the European ofﬁ ce does not meet the traditional image of Ombudsman ordered to 
the legislative power,18 and although basically he is a Parliamentary Ombudsman, the 
supervision is extended as well to the Parliament. Nevertheless, this control is limited: as 
complaints in connection with activities or decisions with rather political than administrative 
nature are not considered to be admissible, hence the Committee on Petitions cannot be 
supervised by the Ombudsman as its activities belong to the Parliament’s political actions.
14 First in the annual reports of 1995 and 1997.
15 See more Friedery, R.: A hivatali visszásság, a maladministration az európai ombudsman 
nézőpontjából (Maladministration from the point of view of the European Ombudsman). Új Magyar 
Közigazgatás, (2009) 10−11, 20−28; Friedery, R.: Az európai ombudsman tevékenységét érintő 
hatásköri kérdések (Questions Regarding the Mandate of the European Ombudsman’s Procedure). 
Állam- és Jogtudomány, 49 (2008) 4, 473−495.
16 See complaint 420/9.2.96/PLMP/B in The European Ombudsman: Annual Report for 1996. 
Luxembourg, 1997, 14.
17 See The European Ombudsman: Report for the year 1995. Luxembourg, 1996, 9.
18 Meese, J. M.: Das Petitionsrecht beim Europäischen Parlament und das Beschwerderecht 
beim Bürgerbeauftragten der Europäischen Union. Frankfurt am Main, 2000, 182.
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3. The decision-making of the Ombudsman
In cases, where the Ombudsman ﬁ nds maladministration at the end of the inquiry and there 
is still a possibility to redress the maladministration by the institution, body, ofﬁ ce or agency 
concerned, or the maladministration is of general nature or more serious, the Ombudsman 
informs the institution concerned and the complainant about his ﬁ nding with a report and a 
draft recommendation. The institution concerned has three month to explain its position in a 
detailed opinion. If the Ombudsman’s draft recommendation is not accepted within the 
time-frame, it is refused, or the institution concerned cannot ﬁ nd any other acceptable 
solution, or the Ombudsman does not ﬁ nd the detailed opinion satisfactory then the 
Ombudsman has authority to make a special report.19 This report is submitted to the 
European Parliament, the concerned institutions and the complainant, in which the instance 
of maladministration is reviewed and a recommendation20 can be laid down, too. In this 
case emphasis is on the European Parliament, because it can help to resolve the situation: 
using the decisions of the Parliament to accept the recommendation and call upon the 
institution to solve the problem.21 The signiﬁ cance of the aforementioned is strengthened by 
the fact that the competence of the European Ombudsman is quite limited, because an 
Ombudsman decision has no binding power.22 This means that if there is no problem-
solving solution between the concerned institutions and the complainant, the Ombudsman 
turns to the last and most signiﬁ cant means: using the help of another institution. The 
importance of a special report is that the concerned institution’s political adjudication is at 
stake. The ﬁ rst special report−concerning the public access of documents−was submitted to 
the Parliament in 1997 and the case ended successfully.23 The special report has no legal 
effects “…vis-à-vis third parties within the meaning of Art. 173 of the Treaty (ex Art. 230 
TEC) and is not binding to the Parliament”, as stated by the Court of First Instance in Case 
T-103/99. Indeed, the Parliament is “…free to decide, within the framework of the powers 
conferred on it by the Treaty, what steps are to be taken in relation to it”.24 Therefore, the 
Parliament can freely decide to adopt a decision about the Ombudsman’s recommendation, 
namely, adopting a decision the Parliament calls upon the concerned institution to settle 
the case.
However, the European Ombudsman has another reporting obligation, similarly to his 
other European counterparts. According to Art. 228 of TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) and Art. 
3(8) of Decision 94/262 of the European Parliament, the Ombudsman has to submit an 
annual report at the end of each annual session in connection with the outcome of the 
inquires. Neither this report has binding effect to the Parliament, but in the frame of the 
19 See more special reports on http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/specialreports.faces.
20 Art. 8(4) of the Implementing Provisions.
21 For example in case 713/98/IJH, after submitting a special report, the European Parliament 
called on the European Commission to hand over data requested before by the complainant.
22 See Case C-167/06 P Komninou and Others v. Commission [2007] ECR I-141, para. 44.
23 Special Report by the European Ombudsman to the European Parliament following the own 
initiative inquiry into public access to documents (616/PUBAC/F/IJH) http://www.ombudsman.
europa.eu/en/cases/specialreport.faces/en/378/html.bookmark
24 See Case T-103/99 Associazione delle Cantine Sociali Venete v. Ombudsman and Parliament 
[2000] ECR II-4165, para. 50.
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annual report the Ombudsman has the opportunity to give general observations regarding 
the conduct of the institutions’.25; 26
4. Election and dismissal
According to Arts. 228 of TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) and 194 of the European Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure, the Ombudsman is elected by the European Parliament. I must draw 
the attention to an earlier inconsistency, namely, that there was an election and a nomination 
procedure as well. First, the ofﬁ ce had been ﬁ lled by an election procedure, and after 
winning the election procedure the candidate was appointed by the European Parliament. 
Therefore, some authors have mentioned the European Ombudsman as an elected ofﬁ cial, 
while others as an appointed one, since the Ombudsman was both elected and appointed. 
This quite inconsistent rule has been abolished by the Lisbon Treaty, since it amended the 
relevant article: according to the amendment the Ombudsman is elected by the Parliament, 
and thus the election procedure is not followed by a separate appointment.
The amendment of the Lisbon Treaty has not only resolved the contradictions between 
the two terms, but the new wording reinforces the independence and the legitimacy became 
stronger. That is to say, the appointment carries dependency between the appointed and the 
appointer, as opposed to a democratic election.
Art. 228 of the TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) does not rule any speciﬁ c requirements for 
the person holding the ofﬁ ce. However, with a closer look, a number of conditions can be 
seen as a guarantee of impartiality and knowledge necessary for the performance of this 
duty. First, only EU citizen can take the ofﬁ ce of the European Ombudsman, who must 
possess a full range of civil and political rights, as well as every guarantee of independence. 
This person is necessary to meet the conditions for the exercise of the highest judicial 
position in his or her country, or have the acknowledged competence and experience to take 
on the duties of the European ofﬁ ce.27 
From the point of view of the wording, the phrase “or” implies the possibility that it is 
not necessary to have legal qualiﬁ cation for the position if the person concerned has 
sufﬁ cient expertise and experience. Nonetheless, this expertise and experience has to be 
that thorough, which allows decision-making and task completing in complex legal issues. 
The requirement of expertise is underlined as well by the fact that so far only such persons 
have been elected to head the ofﬁ ce, who, as national ombudsmen had gained sufﬁ cient 
experience.28 Analyzing their professional life, we shall draw attention to the fact that while 
Söderman29 gained wide experience thanks to its position in various ﬁ elds of the 
25 See the annual reports on http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreports.faces.
26 See Case T-103/99, para. 50.
27 Art. 6(2) of the Statute.
28 Jacob Söderman was a Finnish Ombudsman before the appointment, while the incumbent 
Nikiforos Diamandouros was before the ﬁ rst Greek Ombudsman.
29 The course of life of Jacob Söderman shows that an Ombudsman with experiences in different 
areas of the administration was elected: Minister of Justice in 1971, Member of Parliament in 1972–
82, Head of Labour Safety, Department in the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health in 1971−1982, 
Governor of the Province of Uusimaa 1982–89, Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland 1989–95. Of 
course, other positions in public or educational life were occupied by him, but basically he is a 
practical expert. Since September 2007 he works as a Member of the Finnish Parliament.
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administration, and Diamandouros30 made notable career in the academic life. In short, 
while the ﬁ rst European Ombudsman received the ofﬁ ce as practical expert, the second as 
academic professional. 
The provisions regarding the appointment and removal following the election can be 
found in the TFEU and the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament.31 At the early 
stages the provisions regarding the election soon proved to be in need of amendment, for 
example the candidate elected by simple majority of the Committee on Petitions should 
have been presented to the full meeting, but the election twice failed, hence the appointment 
of the Ombudsman had to wait until June 1995. Indeed, these election rules went over many 
changes. The then President of the European Parliament on 14 November of 1994 raised the 
question of amendment of the provisions regarding the Ombudsman’s appointment. As a 
result, the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Veriﬁ cation of Credentials and 
Immunities decided to recommend the amendment of Art. 159, and having ﬁ nished the draft 
it was submitted to the Parliament on 29 November.32 The Parliament returned the report on 
its 14th December meeting to the Committee, which then prepared and presented a second 
draft.33 This second report was repeatedly returned to the Committee on 14 March 1995, 
30 Diamandouros was in 1980−1983 Director of Development at Athens College, in 1983−1988 
Program Director for Western Europe and the Near and Middle East at the Social Science Research 
Council, New York, in 1988−1991 Director of the Greek Institute for International and Strategic 
Studies, in 1995−1998 Director and Chairman of the Greek National Centre for Social Research 
(EKKE), has been Professor of comparative politics at the Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration of the University of Athens since 1993. In 1999 and 2000, he was appointed member 
of Greece’s National Commission on Human Rights and the National Council for Administrative 
Reform, respectively, from 1998 to 2003 the ﬁ rst National Ombudsman of Greece.
31 While the Maastricht Treaty setting up the ofﬁ ce was signed on the 7 February in 1992 
(entered into force in November 1993), the Statute of the Ombudsman was adopted by the Parliament 
only on the 9 March of 1994.
32 The report suggested the following amendments. According the amended Art. 159(4) the 
committee submits its candidates for vote in the order of votes obtained in committee instead of 
choice of candidate. The new subsection (6) says that in electing the Ombudsman the Parliament shall 
apply the provisions of Rule 14(1) by analogy instead of a secret ballot held on the basis of a majority 
of the votes cast. Subsections (5) and (8) were deleted, namely the vote shall be put on the agenda for 
the part-session following the forwarded proposal, and in case of negative vote the committee makes 
a new proposal or the President of Parliament issues a further call for nominations. See more Report 
on the amendment of Rule 159 of the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning the 
appointment of the Ombudsman. Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Veriﬁ cation of Credentials 
and Immunities, 29 November 1994 (A4-0085/94) PE 210.749.
33 According to the amendments
– the President of Parliament shall not only after his election but in the cases referred to in Rule 
159(10) call for nomination,
–  the call is to be published in the Ofﬁ cial Journal of the European Communities,
–  the nominations must include all supporting documents,
– three to ﬁ ve nominations shall be selected and then submitted in alphabetical order by the 
committee, except when there is only three or less nominations, in this cases these are automatically 
submitted to Parliament,
– regarding the before mentioned, the proposals are to be placed on the agenda for the part 
session,
– only the two candidates obtaining the largest number of votes can continue after the ﬁ rst 
ballot, and in the event of a tie the older candidate shall be elected,
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which then submitted a third report34 proposing the amendments. The Parliament ﬁ nally 
adopted a decision on May 16 amending the Rules of Procedure.35
Following the amendments of the election process, Jacob Söderman, the ﬁ rst European 
Ombudsman was elected in June 1995 and then re-elected in 1999, whereas after his 
retirement on 1 April 2003 Nikiforos Diamandouros took charge of the ofﬁ ce for the 
remaining time of the parliamentary term. Then, at the start of the new parliamentary term, 
Diamandouros was elected as the new European Ombudsman on 11 January 2005.
Another aspect of the relation between the Ofﬁ ce and the Parliament is that the 
Ombudsman’s term of ofﬁ ce has the same duration as of the Parliament, and the election 
takes place after every parliamentary election. Although the procedure for electing the 
Ombudsman is a little complex, it includes many elements of transparency,36 and this 
underlined for example by the provision that at the beginning of each parliamentary term 
the President of the European Parliament calls for the nomination of the Ombudsman either 
immediately after his election, or at the case of death or dismissal of the Ombudsman, and 
for the submission of nominations sets a time-limit.37 
According to the regulations the candidate must have the support of the representative 
of at least forty Member State, who are nationals of at least two Member States, and one 
representative can support only one candidate. To meet the criteria of openness and 
transparency, there are other guarantying provisions. The hearings are public for 
representatives. Thereafter, a list of the formal nominations in alphabetical order is to be 
submitted to the Parliament. After the secret vote, the majority of the votes decides and the 
vote may consist of three rounds, in cases if it fails to elect a candidate with an absolute 
majority in the ﬁ rst two rounds. In the third round only the two candidates with the most 
votes in the second round can be voted.38 In this case the simple majority of the present 
representatives decide, however in tie vote the older candidate prevails. Before the vote 
begins, the President must ensure that at least half of the Members of Parliament is present. 
Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Ombudsman was appointed by the qualiﬁ ed majority of the 
Parliament following the parliamentary elections. Because of the nature and the extent of 
the preparatory work regarding the appointment, the Committee on Petitions carried out a 
large amount of these works.39
– the nominations received to the call are automatically to be considered admitted to the 
selection process until the renunciation of the person. See more Second report on the amendment of 
Rule 159 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning the appointment of the Ombudsman. 
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Veriﬁ cation of Credentials and Immunities, 21 February 
1995 (A4-0024/95) PE 211.013/ﬁ n.
34 Third report on the amendment of Rule 159 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedures concerning 
appointment of the Ombudsman. Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Veriﬁ cation of Credentials 
and Immunities, 25 April 1995 (A4-0094/95).
35 Decision amending Rule 159 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure concerning appointment of 
the Ombudsman, 16 May 1995 (Ofﬁ cial Journal 1995 C 151, 33).
36 Pierucci, A.: Les recours au médiateur européen. In: Epaminondas, M. A.: European 
Citizenship. Maastricht, 1994, 114.
37 Rule 204 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament.
38 Ibid. Rule 205(5).
39 During Diamandouros’s ﬁ rst electoral procedure in 2005, in the ﬁ rst round 564 voted in 
support for him from the 609 votes cast, thus it can be said that the representatives were convinced by 
his substitute for Söderman following the his retirement. OJ L21, 1.25.2005, 8.
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The duties of the Ombudsman can be ceased when the current term of ofﬁ ce expires, 
namely, with the entry into ofﬁ ce of the new Ombudsman. This occurs when the Ombudsman 
is not re-elected to a new parliamentary term.40 If the mandate is terminated prematurely, 
for the remaining parliamentary term the Parliament appoints the successor within a three-
month time-limit. Except for the case of dismissal, the Ombudsman will remain in ofﬁ ce 
until his successor takes ofﬁ ce.41 Resignation, the event of death and dismissal can also lead 
to the duties to be ceased. To the request of the European Parliament the Court can dismiss 
the Ombudsman if he no longer fulﬁ ls the conditions, or is guilty in serious misconduct, 
and did not voluntarily resign. That is, according to Rule 206 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the European Parliament, one tenth of the representatives can request the dismissal. The 
request of the members is forwarded to the relevant committee, whose members will decide 
whether there are any well-founded grounds for dismissal. If there are, a report will be 
submitted to the Parliament and released to vote. However, before the vote, at his request, 
the Ombudsman can express his own views. Before the secret-ballot, the President of the 
Parliament ensures that half of the Parliament’s component members are present. If they 
decide to remove the Ombudsman from the ofﬁ ce, the Ombudsman resigns. Nonetheless, it 
can happen that the Ombudsman does not resign voluntarily then the President applies to 
the Court of Justice regarding the dismissal. So thus we can see in the case of the dismissal 
that after a vote of conﬁ dence, where the majority is in favour of the dismissal, the 
Ombudsman has the option of voluntary departure, namely to resign, and if the Ombudsman 
does not take this possibility, the drastic way follows. 
5. Aspects of independence
Although it is generally accepted that the complete independence and impartiality is of great 
importance in every Ombudsman’s position, independence is in particular emphasized in 
the case of the European Ombudsman,42 which is toned down by the fact that the power of 
the Ombudsman is always granted by some other body. The European Ombudsman’s 
independence can be seen as a coherent one, whose elements are following: independence 
laying in the person of the Ombudsman, independence of the ofﬁ ce staff, independence of 
the ofﬁ ce from budgetary side.
5.1. Independence of the Ombudsman
According to Art. 228 of the TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) the European Ombudsman carries 
out his duties in complete independence, furthermore Art. 9 of the Ombudsman’s Statute 
declares that the Ombudsman shall be completely independent. These provisions are taken 
into practice, when the Ombudsman takes an oath before the Court of Justice to perform his 
duties with complete independence. The rules limiting the scope of activity ensure the 
realization of the impartiality requirement: during the term of ofﬁ ce the Ombudsman is not 
permitted to hold any political or administrative ofﬁ ce, or engage in other occupations 
gainful or not, thus cannot engage any educational position, and following the election the 
Ombudsman must refrain from any other activities incompatible with this position.
40 Both Jacob Söderman and Nikiforos Diamandouros were re-elected.
41 Art. 7 of the Statute.
42 Gregory, R.: The European Union Ombudsman. In: Gregory, R.–Giddings, Ph. (eds): Righting 
Wrongs: The Ombudsman in Six Continent. Amsterdam, 2000, 159.
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The requirement regarding independence is underlined by the provisions that the duties 
are performed with complete independence, in the general interest of the Communities and 
of the citizens of the Union, namely, the Ombudsman can neither seek nor accept instructions 
from any government or other body, and must refrain from any action incompatible with the 
nature of his duties. Whereas the Ombudsman acts in the general interest, accordingly, 
independence is essential for the undiminished conﬁ dence towards the fair procedures of 
the Ombudsman.
It is very important to mention whether the independence is not affected by the 
possibility of election and re-election. Theoretically, it is possible that the Ombudsman−in 
order to be re-elected−tries to please to the Parliament during the ofﬁ cial activities. On one 
hand, however, this is contradicted by the facts that in person an active ofﬁ cial determined 
in many topics and subject matters took up the role as European Ombudsman as seen before 
in different cases, and his successor follows this path as well−both of whom had national 
experiences in this kind of work. On the other hand, the position of the European 
Ombudsman differs from several national Ombudsmen, because the supervision of the 
Parliament falls within the competence of this body. Furthermore, abandoning the 
nomination process by the European Parliament, strengthened the democratic nature. Here, 
we should point out that although the Ombudsman can be dismissed by the Parliament, it is 
only possible in cases of serious misconduct or the conditions for the performance of duties 
are not fulﬁ lled any longer.
5.2. Independence of the Ofﬁ ce
At the initial establishment of the ofﬁ ce, the independence of the staff had not been 
sufﬁ ciently guaranteed, hence Section I regarding the European Parliament in the European 
Communities’ budget planned for the ﬁ nancial year 1995 provided that staff engaged in 
investigation of cases in accordance with Art. 228 of TFEU (ex Art. 195 TEC) is employed 
on temporary basis, while the rest of the staff is ordered by the Secretary-General of the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament had already held the view that in order to 
maintain the independence and effectiveness of the Ombudsman’s activities the entire staff 
should be assigned to the Ofﬁ ce during the period of the Ombudsman’s mandate and the 
EU’s three institution should record in a joint statement principles governing on one hand 
for the staff employed by the Ombudsman, on the other hand for the status of temporary or 
contract staff conducting inquires, in a way to ensure the effectiveness and independence of 
the Ombudsman.43
The institutional independence is strengthened by several provisions. The current 
legislation states that the Ombudsman may specify the internal structural and internal rules 
of procedure. Furthermore the Ombudsman is assisted by a secretariat, and the principal 
ofﬁ cer is appointed by him. In matters concerning the staff, the Ombudsman has the same 
status as the institutions within the meaning of Art. 1 of Staff Regulations of Ofﬁ cials of the 
European Communities.44 The secretariat’s ofﬁ cials and servants are subject to the rules and 
regulations applicable to ofﬁ cials and other servants of the European Communities, and 
their number per year is approved as part of the budgetary procedure. Those ofﬁ cials of the 
European Communities and of the Member States, who are appointed to the secretariat, are 
43 European Parliament Resolution on the role of the European Ombudsman appointed by the 
European Parliament, 14 July 1995. OJ 1995 C 249, 226.
44 Art. 11(4) of the Statute.
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to be seconded in the interests of the service and are guaranteed to automatic reinstatement 
in their institution of origin.45 The secondment is a decision by the institution of origin, 
which can be a Community institution or body or an institution from the Member States. 
The obligation to reinstate a certain ofﬁ cial is therefore for the institution of origin. As far 
as the Community institutions are concerned, the secondment is foreseen in the staff 
regulations and the obligation for the administration is therefore clear. For institutions in the 
Member States, the Ombudsman could merely ensure, in the exchange of letters foreseen in 
the enclosed provisions, that the guarantee foreseen in the Statute of the European 
Ombudsman is offered to the ofﬁ cial in question.46
5.3. Budgetary independence
In the preliminary period after the nomination of the ﬁ rst Ombudsman in 1995 and 1996, 
the Parliament made provision for the Ofﬁ ce’s staff and material needs, which support was 
based on an agreement between the Parliament and the Ombudsman of 22 September 1995. 
From the ﬁ nancial year 1997 all operating costs of the Ombudsman’s secretariat was 
covered by its own budget; but the European Parliament still provided the assistance 
necessary for avoiding unnecessary duplication of staff and expenditure. In the ﬁ rst annual 
report of the Ofﬁ ce in 1995, the ofﬁ ce’s budget was annexed to the Parliament’s budget and 
regarded as “a guarantee of independence of the Ombudsman and which should be treated 
in the same way”47. The Statute originally provided that the Ofﬁ ce’s budget is annexed to 
the Parliament’s one in the budget of the European Union, however, the Council later on 
agreed with a proposal suggesting the Ombudsman’s budget shall be wholly independent, 
and after the decision from 1 January 2000 the budget can be ﬁ nd in a separate chapter in 
the Union’s budget, currently in Section 8. 
***
As shown in the study the complex nature of the relation means that the Parliament is 
represent almost in every momentum of the Ofﬁ ce’s life. The Ofﬁ ce can be regarded as the 
extended arm of the Parliament, as a complementary of its control mechanism. However, as 
the analyzed aspects clearly underline, this complementary function does not mean 
dependent role but a co-ordinate relation, which is among others mostly strengthened by the 
fact that the Parliament was put under the Ombudsman’s mandate, contrary to several 
examples in Member States.
45 Ibid. Art.11(3).
46 The European Ombudsman: Rules applicable to the secondment of ofﬁ cials and agents from 
international, national, regional and local public administrations and bodies to the European 
Ombudsman and to the secondment of the European Ombudsman ofﬁ cials and of temporary agents to 
international, national, regional and local public administrations and bodies. The document was made 
available for research by the Ofﬁ ce of the European Ombudsman.
47 The European Ombudsman: Report for the year 1995. Luxembourg, 1996, 6.
